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Abstract 
This paper considers time-inconsistent output subsidy/tax policies in free-entry mixed markets 
and compares committed and non-committed regimes under different competition modes. In a 
committed regime where the subsidy is determined before the private firms enter the market, the 
optimal rate is zero in either Cournot game or Stackelberg game when the public firm is a follower, 
while it is negative in Stackelberg game with public leadership. However, in the non-committed 
regime where the subsidy is not determined before entry, the optimal rate is always positive. Finally, 
we show that private leadership is the best for social welfare regardless of the timing of output 
subsidy/tax policies. 
JEL Classifications: L13, H42, H20 
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1. Introduction 
It is a well-established fact in economic theory and practice that among many alternative policy 
measures of a government, the public institution and output subsidy (tax) policies are very important 
instruments to enhance the economic efficiency. The government can improve social welfare by 
holding public enterprises directly,1 while it can also indirectly influence activities of firms in the 
market by providing output subsidy (or imposing tax).2 
The literature on mixed oligopolies with public and private firms in an imperfect competition 
market has provided many policy considerations on output subsidy to draw practical policy 
implications. For example, White (1996), Pal and White (1998) and Poyago-Theotoky (2001) showed 
that output subsidy policy can achieve the first-best outcomes irrespective of the ownership of a 
public firm unless there exists political cost.3 Further, Tomaru and Saito (2010) considered an 
endogenous timing game, Matsumura and Tomaru (2013) studied the excess burden of taxation and 
Cato and Matsumura (2013, 2015) examined a long-run analysis of output subsidy and entry tax along 
with trade policy in free-entry markets. Recently, Lee et al. (2017) compared the different effects 
between output and R&D subsidies as a policy instrument in mixed oligopolies and showed that social 
welfare is higher under the output subsidy. Moreover, Haruna and Goel (2017) emphasized that 
government might have to choose to subsidize output rather than R&D in the case that R&D subsidy is 
relatively more complicated than output subsidy. 
On the other hand, public firm has played a leading role in the mixed industries for many years. 
For example, many researches believed that lending by public financial institutions had a 
                                                             
1 In early discussion, De Fraja and Delbono (1989), Cremer, et al. (1989, 1991) and Delbono and Denicolo 
(1993) showed that a public firm can represent a useful instrument of the government in a mixed market where 
the public firm coexists with private firms, which makes the social welfare to be higher than that in a private 
market. 
2 Tax-subsidy policies are widely observed as industry policies in many countries. See Itoh et al (1991). . 
3 It is showed that privatization does not affect welfare regardless of time structure, competition mode, the 
number of firms, product differentiation, and the degree of privatization under the optimal output subsidy. This 
has been continuously discussed by Pal and White (1998), Poyago-Theotoky (2001), Hashimzade, et al. (2007) 
and Matsumura and Okumura (2013).  
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pump-priming effect on private bank lending.4 Wang and Mukherjee (2012) and Wang and Lee (2013) 
showed that public leadership benefits social welfare under undesirable competition in free entry 
market, while Gelves and Heywood (2013) found that mergers of public and private firms can 
improve welfare under public leadership. However, Pal (1988) and Matsumura and Ogawa (2010) 
emphasized that mixed oligopoly model with private leadership where the public firm takes a follower 
position in output competition is more robust and risk-dominant. Ino and Matsumura (2010) also 
examined the role of public firm in regulated and free-entry industries and showed that private 
leadership provides the highest social welfare in free-entry mixed markets. In contrast, public 
leadership case, where the public firm takes a leader position, provides the lowest level of social 
welfare.5 
In order to integrate these two research streams on mixed oligopolies, this paper considers the 
output subsidy policy and examines the role of public firm in free-entry mixed markets. We also 
examine the timing of the subsidy policy, which can be decided by the government before or after 
observing the entry behaviors of private firms. 6  In particular, we compare committed and 
non-committed subsidy regimes under different competition modes between Cournot and Stackelberg 
games. In the former regime with subsidization-then-entry order, the government chooses the output 
subsidy level before private firms enter the market. Whereas in the latter regime with 
entry-then-subsidization order, the government chooses the output subsidy level after private firms 
enter the market. 
Our analysis reveals the existence of time-inconsistent output subsidy policies between 
committed and non-committed subsidy regimes, and the optimal subsidy policy is dependent on the 
market structure. In particular, we show that the optimal output subsidy rate is zero under the 
                                                             
4 Bose et al. (2014) emphasized that the public sector worldwide has an important role in lending markets. For 
example, public financing occupied an important position in Japan’s financial markets for over 60 years since 
1940s. See Lin and Matsumura (2017).. 
5 The role of leadership and its policy implications are extensively examined by Etro ( 2006, 2007). 
6 For related discussions, see Lee (1999), Davidson and Mukherjee (2007) and Ino and Matsumura (2012) for 
welfare and policy implications for free-entry private markets. Recent works include Cato and Matsumura (2013, 
2017), Xu et al. (2017), Leal et al. (2018), Lee et al. (2018) and Xu and Lee (2018) for free-entry mixed 
oligopolies. 
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committed regime in both Cournot and Stackelberg games with private leadership, while it is negative 
in Stackelberg game with public leadership. However, we find that the output subsidies are always 
positive irrespective of competition mode in the non-committed regime. Finally, we show that private 
leadership is the best for social welfare regardless of the timing of output subsidization policy.  
Our findings complement the previous results in free entry mixed markets where the excessive 
entry exists. Under the committed subsidy regime, there exists a trade-off between over-entry and 
under-production. In the case that the public firm is a follower in both Cournot and Stackelberg games 
with private leadership, the output subsidy will not only increase the number of entering firms but 
increase total market outputs. Thus, the welfare effect of the subsidy is nullified when the market 
demand is linear. (Cato and Matsumura, 2017; Xu and Lee, 2018) However, in the case that the public 
firm is a leader, the output tax will decrease the number of entering firms, but incurs the loss of total 
outputs. Finally, private leadership is the best for social welfare. (Ino and Matsumura, 2010) 
On the other hand, under the non-committed subsidy regime, under-production effect prevails in 
imperfect competition. It implies that output subsidies are always positive irrespective of competition 
mode. Further, private leadership is the best for social welfare regardless of the timing of output 
subsidy/tax policies.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we introduce the basic model of free-entry 
mixed market with output subsidy. In sections 3, 4 and 5, we analyze the committed and 
non-committed subsidization policies in Cournot and Stackelberg public leadership or followership 
games, respectively. In section 6, we provide comparisons between committed and non-committed 
subsidization regimes. In section 7, we conclude our paper. 
2.  The Model 
We consider a mixed oligopoly in which   + 1 firms produce homogeneous commodities. Firm 
0 is a public firm fully owned by a government and firm i ( ni ,...,2,1 ) is a private firm which is 
completely characterized by private property rights. The inverse demand function is denoted by 
  = 1 −  , where P is market price and Q is total market outputs, i.e.,   =    +    
 
   
 where    
is the output of firm 0 and    is the output of firm i. Then, consumer surplus can be denoted as 
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   =   /2. 
The cost function of the firms is identical and quadratic,      = (  )  2⁄ +   , where    is 
the entry cost of each firm. According to Matsumura and Kanda (2005), the fixed cost of public firm 
is a sunk cost to the government, therefore the number of entering firms (or the fixed cost of private 
firm) matters for its policy decisions. The number of private firms is determined at the point where the 
profit of the private firms is equal to zero in a free-entry mixed market. 
We also assume that the government can provide a uniform output subsidy with the rate of s. 
Note that s can be positive (subsidy) or negative (tax). The resulting total subsidy is given as   =   . 
Then, the profit of firm is 
   =     +     −     
 
2⁄ −    for  j=0,…, n ,                                (1) 
We will define social welfare as the sum of consumer surplus and firms’ profit minus total 
subsidy, which is given by: 
  =   +    +    
 
   
−                                                  (2) 
Note that the subsidies are financed from taxpayers in a lump-sum manner, so that they do not 
directly influence welfare. 
Finally, the firms’ objective functions are subject to their ownership structures. We assume that 
the private firm maximizes its profits, while the public firm maximizes the social welfare. 
In the following sections, we shall consider two alternative policy regimes of subsidization 
policy, each featuring a three-stage game between the government and owners of private firms. In 
particular, we examine the properties of different equilibria between government’s committed and 
non-committed subsidization policies. In the former case, the government chooses the output subsidy 
in the first stage and then private firms, taking the subsidy rate as given, enter the market until they 
get zero economic profit. In the latter case, private firms enter the market until they get zero economic 
profit in the first stage and then the government decides its output subsidy level in the second stage. In 
the last stage, all firms choose outputs simultaneously or sequentially, depending on the market 
structure. In the following analysis, we examine three different market structures in the output 
production stage: Cournot or/and Stackelberg public leadership or followership competitions. We 
solve the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of these games by backward induction. 
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3. Simultaneous-move game 
3.1 Committed policy 
In this game, the government chooses the output subsidy before the private firms enter the 
market. Note that the government and public firm has the same objective function in a mixed market. 
Therefore, in the third stage, the public firm chooses    to maximize social welfare while the private 
firms choose    to maximize their profit functions simultaneously and independently. The first order 
conditions yield the resulting outputs7: 
   =
2−   
4+  
                                                                                                                                            (3) 
   =
1 + 2 
4 +  
                                                                                                                                             (4) 
  =
2+  (1 +  )
4+  
                                                                                                                                  (5) 
In the second stage, the private firms enter the market until they get zero profit. The resulting 
number of private firms is given as: 
  =
√6(1+ 2 )− 8 
2 
                                                                                                                           (6) 
Note that as the output subsidy increases, the number of firms entering the market increases, i.e., 
     > 0⁄ . It is reasonable, since the government provides output subsidy to firms, firms will prefer 
to enter the market. 
Assuming that    > 0, we can obtain the equilibrium outputs of public firm and private firms, 
respectively: 
   = 2 
 
 
  −                                                                                                                                        (7)  
   =  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  (8)  
  = 1 − 2 
 
 
  +                                                                                                                                  (9)  
                                                             
7 In this study, all of the second-order conditions are satisfied. 
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In the case that    > 0, we have (i)       < 0⁄ . (ii)       = 0⁄ . (iii)      > 0⁄ . That is, the 
output subsidy decreases the output of public firm but does not change the output of private firm, 
while it increases the number of entering firms and thus increases the total market output.8 
In the first stage, the government chooses the output subsidy that maximizes social welfare, 
defined in (2). Substituting the equilibrium outcomes, obtained in the previous stages, into    and 
taking a differentiation with respect to s, yields: 
Lemma 1.   
  = 0 when 0 <   <
 
3
2
4
. 
where we employ the subscript “B” to denote the equilibrium is under the committed subsidization 
policy. It represents that social welfare will be maximized without output subsidy under the 
committed subsidization regime. It also implies that if the government provides output subsidization 
policy, it will distort the number of firms as well as total output production and consequently reduce 
social welfare. 
The resulting number of private firms is given as: 
  
  =
√6− 8 
2 
                                                                                                                                     (10) 
Note that   
  > 0 when 0 <   <
 
3
2
4
. 
The equilibrium outputs are as follows: 
  
   = 2 
2
3
                                                                                                                                          (11)  
  
   =  
 
 
                                                                                                                                             (12)  
  
  =
1
3
(3− 2√6 )                                                                                                                              (13)  
Finally, the resulting welfare is as follows:  
                                                             
8 These results are well known in the literature. For example, Lee (1999) considered an environmental tax in 
free-entry private markets while Cato and Matsumura (2017) considered an output tax in free-entry mixed 
markets. 
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   
  =
1
6
(3− 4√6  + 10 2)                                                                                                             (14) 
3.2 Non-committed policy 
In this game, the government chooses the output subsidy after the private firms enter the market. 
The last stage in output choice is the same as in the committed subsidization case, where the 
equilibrium outputs of the firms are derived in (3) and (4).  
In the second stage, the government chooses the welfare maximizing output subsidy level. The 
first order condition of this problem yields the following optimal output subsidy: 
 =
1
2+  
                                                                                                                                              (15) 
Note that output subsidy is decreasing in the number of private firms, i.e.,      ⁄ < 0. 
Then the resulting outputs are given as follows: 
   =
1
2+  
                                                                                                                                            (16) 
   =
1
2+  
                                                                                                                                             (17) 
  =
1 +  
2+  
                                                                                                                                              (18) 
Note, that (i) 
   
  
=
   
  
< 0; (ii) 
  
  
> 0. That is, the output of each firm is decreasing in the number 
of private firms while the total outputs are increasing in the number of private firms. Thus, when the 
number of private firms increases, business-stealing effect reduces the output of existing firm but the 
scale effect of the number of private firms outweighs business-stealing effect, which results in that the 
total output increases. 
In the first stage, private firms enter the market until they get zero profit. Therefore, substituting 
the resulting outputs and output subsidy into (1), we can obtain the profit of private firms. Hereafter, 
we equalize obtained profit function to zero and solve it for n, in order to get optimal number of 
private firms in the market: 
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  
  =
√6− 4 
2 
                                                                                                                                      (19) 
where the subscript “A” denotes the equilibrium is under the government’s non-committed subsidies. 
Note that   
  > 0 when 0 <   <
 
 
 
 
. 
Lemma 2.   
  =  
 
 
  > 0 when 0 <   <
 
 
 
 
. 
It represents that social welfare will be maximized with positive output subsidy in a non-committed 
subsidization regime. Here, the government decided the output subsidy after observing the number of 
private firms, which can be treated as a fixed number of private firms. This market structure causes 
under-production because of imperfect competition. Thus, the government has a strong incentive to 
use an output subsidy policy to achieve the optimal social welfare. Hence, when the government 
provides an output subsidy policy after the firms enter the market, it will increase total production and 
social welfare9. 
    The resulting outputs are as follows: 
  
   =  
 
 
                                                                                                                                             (20)  
  
   =  
 
 
                                                                                                                                              (21)  
  
  = 1 −  
 
 
                                                                                                                                       (22)  
    The resulting welfare is given as: 
   
  =
1
2
− 2 
2
3
  +                                                                                                                          (23) 
3.3 Comparisons  
We compare the committed and non-committed policies. 
                                                             
9 These results are also well known in the literature of mixed oligopolies. For example, see, Poyago−Theotoky 
(2001). 
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Proposition 1. Suppose that 0 <   <
 
3
2
4
. Then, we have:  
(i)   
   >   
  . (ii)   
   =   
   . (iii)   
  <   
  . (iv)   
  <   
  . (v) 0 =   
  <   
  . (vi)    
  >    
  . 
It states that the output of public firm of committed subsidization is higher than that of 
non-committed subsidization while the outputs of private firms are equal in both subsidization 
regimes. Thus, the total output of committed subsidization is lower than that of non-committed 
subsidization. Note that the output subsidy effect can be offset by the effect on the number of private 
firms which is endogenously chosen in committed subsidization case. This induces a lower output 
subsidy but a larger number of private firms and total outputs than that in non-committed 
subsidization. Moreover, a decrease in subsidy stimulates the production of the public firm while the 
output of private firms is independent with output subsidy because of zero profits. Hence, the social 
welfare of committed subsidization is higher than that of non-committed subsidization. 
4. Sequential-move game with public leadership 
 4.1 Committed policy 
In this game, first the public firm and then the private firms choose their output quantity levels 
sequentially. Further, in the second stage private firms enter the market. Then, the government 
chooses optimal output subsidy rate in the first stage. 
The first-order condition of private firms to maximize profit function given in (1) provides the 
reaction function, which we put into (2) and maximization procedure yields the equilibrium outputs in 
the third stage and resulting number of private firms in the second stage as following: 
   =
1
6
(3 + √6  + 3 −   9(1 +  )
2 − 42 2 + 6√6 (3 − 1))                                      (24)  
   =  
2
3
                                                                                                                                             (25)  
  = 1 − 2 
 
 
  +                                                                                                                              (26)  
  =
−10  + √6(1 +  )+  −28   + 6(1 +  )  + 4√6 (−1 + 3 )
4 
                                 (27) 
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Note that the output subsidy increases the number of entering firms i.e.,      > 0⁄ .  
In the first stage, government chooses the optimal output subsidy level: 
Lemma 3.   
  =
 
  
 −45− 36√6  −
 
 
√  +
 
 
√  < 0 when 0.27 <   < 0.306. 
Where “a” and “b” are parts of   
   function, which composed by F and described in Appendix. 
It implies that the output subsidy is negative, which is used as an output tax in the committed 
subsidization with a public leadership. When the public firm is a leader in a free-entry market, it has a 
strong incentive to reduce its output, which will induce private firms to produce more outputs and 
more entries. Thus, the government uses an output tax to avoid the loss of social welfare. This results 
a larger cost to entering firms thus causes a lower number of private firms. 
Substituting the optimal output subsidy into (27) yields the equilibrium number of private firms: 
  
  =
1
32 
 3√6− 4√6  + 4√6 − 104  +  2                                                                    (28) 
Note that   
  > 0 when 0.27 <   < 0.306. 
Then the resulting equilibrium outcomes are given as: 
  
   =
1
48
 9− 12√  + 12√  − 4√6  −  3                                                                          (29) 
  
   =  
 
 
                                                                                                                                            (30) 
  
  =
3
8
−
√ 
2
+
√ 
2
−
7 
√6
                                                                                                                (31) 
   
  =
 
  
(18   −
 
  
(−3+ 4√  − 4√ + 4√6 )(69+ 36√ − 36√ + 36√6  + √3√(27+ 48  + 72√ + 48 −
440√6  + 96√6   − 1760   − 24√ (3+ 4√  + 4√6 )))−
 
 
 (32√6+ 3√2√(27+ 48  + 48 − 440√6  −
1760   + 24√ (3+ 4√6 )− 24√ (3+ 4√ + 4√6 ))))                                  (32) 
 4.2 Non-committed policy 
The last stage in output choice is the same as in the previous committed subsidy case, where the 
equilibrium outputs of the firms are derived in (24) and (25). Then, the government chooses optimal 
output subsidy rate in the second stage. Finally, the private firms enter the market in the first stage. 
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In the second stage, the government chooses the optimal output subsidy from the differentiation of W 
in (2) with respect to s, which yields: 
 =
1
2+  
                                                                                                                                            (33) 
Note that the output subsidy is decreasing in the number of private firms, i.e.,      ⁄ < 0. In the first 
stage, by substituting the resulting outputs and output subsidy we can obtain following number of 
private firms in the market: 
  
  =
√6− 4 
2 
                                                                                                                                    (34) 
where   
  > 0 when 0 <   <
 
 
 
 
. 
Lemma 4.   
  =  
 
 
  > 0 when 0 <   <
 
 
 
 
. 
It implies that the output subsidy of non-committed regime is positive under public leadership, 
which is similar with that in Cournot model (Simultaneous-move game). 
The equilibrium outcomes are given as: 
  
   =  
 
 
                                                                                                                                           (35)  
  
   =  
 
 
                                                                                                                                            (36)  
  
  = 1 −  
 
 
                                                                                                                                     (37)  
   
  =
 
 
− 2 
 
 
 +                                                                                                                          (38)  
 4.3 Comparisons  
Proposition 2. Suppose 0.27 <   < 0.306. Then, we have: 
(i)   
   >   
  . (ii)   
   =   
  . (iii)   
  <   
 . (iv)   
  <   
 . (v)   
  < 0 <   
 . (vi)    
  >    
   
We obtain the same results with that in Cournot model, which implies that the output of public 
firm of committed subsidy is higher than that of non-committed subsidy. The outputs of private firms 
are same in both cases, but the total output as well as the number of private firms is lower in 
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committed subsidy case. Moreover, the optimal output subsidy of committed subsidy is lower than 
that of non-committed subsidy. However, the social welfare of committed subsidy is higher than that 
of non-committed subsidy. 
5. Sequential-move game with private leadership 
 5.1 Committed policy 
In this game, first the private firm and then the public firm choose their output quantity levels 
sequentially. After calculating the equilibrium outputs and number of private firms respectively, in the 
third and second stage, we can obtain the optimal output subsidy in the first stage. 
Lemma 5.   
  = 0 when 0 <   <
 
 
.  
It implies that no output subsidy maximizes the social welfare under the committed subsidy with 
a private leadership. When the public firm is a follower, it decides its behavior after observing the 
private firms’ action in the market. Thus, each firm’s behavior in the market gets closer to marginal 
cost pricing. Similar with that in Cournot model, zero output subsidy/tax is optimal. 
Then, the equilibrium outcomes are as follows: 
  
  = −3+
 
 
                                                                                                                                      (39)  
where   
  > 0 when 0 <   <
 
 
. 
The equilibrium outcomes are given as: 
  
   =
3 
2
                                                                                                                                             (40) 
  
   =                                                                                                                                                   (41) 
  
  = 1 −
3 
2
                                                                                                                                       (42) 
   
  =
1
4
(2− 6  + 5  )                                                                                                                   (43) 
5.2 Non-committed policy 
The last stage in output choice is the same as in the previous committed subsidy case; and then 
we obtain the optimal output subsidy in the second stage. 
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Lemma 6.   
  =
 
 
> 0 when 0 <   <
 
 
. 
Then, substituting the results into (1) provides the number of private firms in the first stage: 
  
  =
1 − 2 
 
                                                                                                                                       (44) 
Note that   
  > 0 when 0 <   <
 
 
.  
Then, the equilibrium outcomes are given as: 
  
   =                                                                                                                                                   (45) 
  
   =                                                                                                                                                    (46) 
  
  = 1 −                                                                                                                                             (47) 
   
  =
 
 
−
  
 
+                                                                                                                                  (48)  
 5.3 Comparisons  
Proposition 3. Suppose 0 <   <
 
 
. Then, we have: 
(i)   
   >   
  . (ii)   
   =   
  . (iii)   
  <   
 . (iv)   
  <   
 . (v) 0 =   
  <   
 . (vi)    
  >    
  
We obtain the same results that the optimal output subsidy of committed subsidy is lower than that of 
non-committed subsidy, but the social welfare of committed subsidy is higher than that of 
non-committed subsidy. 
6. Comparison and Discussion 
6.1 Committed policy 
Proposition 4. Suppose 0.27 <   < 0.306. Then, we have: 
(i)   
   <   
   <   
  ; (ii)   
   =   
   <   
  ; (iii)   
  <   
  <   
 . (iv)   
  <   
  <   
 . 
(v)   
  <   
  =   
  = 0. (vi)    
  <    
  <    
   
It states that the Cournot model provides the highest output of public firm. However, the private 
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leadership provides the highest output of private firms, so is the total output and the number of private 
firms. These results are consistent to Ino and Matsumura (2010). Further, the output subsidy under 
public leadership will be used as an output tax and which is lower than that of Cournot and private 
leadership where there are no output subsidies. Thus, the private leadership provides the best social 
welfare. 
6.2 Non-committed policy 
Proposition 5. Suppose 0 <   <
 
 
. Then, we have:  
(i)   
   =   
   <   
  ; (ii)   
   =   
   <   
  ; (iii)   
  <   
  =   
  . (iv)   
  <   
  =   
  .  
(v) 0 <   
  <   
  =   
  . (vi)    
  =    
  <    
   
It states that the private leadership provides the highest output of both public and private firms, 
however, it provides the lowest total outputs and the number of private firms. Thus, private leadership 
provides the lowest output subsidy while the public leadership and the Cournot model have the same 
output subsidy. It is sharply contrast to Proposition 4. Moreover, the private leadership provides a 
higher social welfare than that of public leadership and Cournot model which provide the same social 
welfares. 
Proposition 6. The equilibrium outcomes under the committed subsidization with public followership 
is the best to the society when 0 <   <
 
 
. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper investigated time-inconsistent output subsidy/tax policies in free-entry mixed markets 
and compared the equilibrium outcomes of committed and non-committed subsidy regimes, 
respectively, under different competition modes. We found that the output subsidy does not affect the 
social welfare in both Cournot and private leadership, while it is used as an output tax under the 
public leadership in committed case. However, it is always used as an output subsidy under the 
non-committed case. We also found that the output subsidy is always lower in the committed case 
than that of the non-committed case. Nevertheless, committed regime provides higher social welfare. 
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Finally, we show that private leadership is the best for social welfare regardless of the timing of 
output subsidy/tax policies. These results suggest that policymakers have to implement liberalization 
policy before firms enter the market and induce the public institution (organization) to be a follower. 
The consequences of implementing these policies in a combined manner are expected to be superior 
for society. 
We believe that our results are robust and its implications are useful in the real world. But, there 
are still remain many limitations mainly because of its model-specific assumptions. However, 
extending this model with other influential parameters remains for the future researches. In particular, 
the analysis with differentiated products market and/or foreign penetration can be promising topics for 
future research. 
Appendix:  ,   and  . 
  = 48 2 + 3(3+ 4 )2 + 8√6(−55+ 12 )  − 1760 2 − 24 (3+ 4 + 4√6 ) 
  =
(        √          )(  √ )  ⁄       ⁄ (  √ )   ⁄         ⁄ (  ( (  (  √      )   )   √ )  )
    (  √ )  ⁄
  
  =
62208√6   + 32  (4212+ 41√ )+ 4√6 (2511+ 82√ )+ √ (33+ 72 )− 243
72√ 
 
Where  
  =
(        √          )(  √ )  ⁄       ⁄ (  √ )   ⁄         ⁄ (  ( (  (  √      )   )   √ )  )
(  √ )  ⁄
  
  =
   (  ( (  (  √      )   )   √ )  )    ⁄ (  √ )   ⁄
       ⁄ (  √ )  ⁄
  
  = 11664(27− 837√6  + 6264 2 + 14214√6 3 − 56736 4 − 132672√6 5 − 296128 6)  
  = 136048896((592√6   + 2480   − 9− 30√6  − 162  )  + (837√6  − 27− 6264   −  14214√6   +
56736   + 132672√6   + 296128  ) )   
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